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INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in the corporate landscape.1 For most of the twentieth century, well into the early 1990s, directors
† Distinguished Professor of Corporate and Business Law, Clarke Business Law Institute,
Cornell University Law School.
1 This shift has been analyzed in a number of recent publications. See, e.g., GERALD F. DAVIS,
MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA 59-101 (2009); Edward B.
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and executives of large U.S. corporations saw themselves as stewards of
great economic institutions that should serve not only equity investors but
also customers, creditors, employees, suppliers, and the broader society.2
Today this “managerialist” philosophy is viewed as obsolete and inefficient.
Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholdercentered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes “maximizing
shareholder value” (typically measured by share price) over all other
corporate goals.3
What have been the practical results of the shift? The philosophy of
“shareholder primacy” overtook managerialism in large part because it was
thought to offer a cure for the “agency cost” problem of corporate managers
neglecting shareholders’ interests in order to serve their own. Today, many
argue that the shareholder primacy cure has largely succeeded in eliminating
any significant divide between managers’ and shareholders’ interests.4
Institutional shareholders in particular enjoy more influence over corporate
boards today than at any other time in American business history, and
executives are far more focused on keeping share prices high.
Yet there are signs that the shareholder primacy cure has troubling side
effects. This concern provides the basis for the two Articles reviewed in this
Response: one by Edward Rock and the other by Barry Adler and Marcel
Kahan.5 These Articles point out that increasing shareholders’ influence in
public companies and driving managers to focus on share price to the
exclusion of other considerations can help shareholders by harming corporate creditors. Each Article offers novel and plausible approaches for
ameliorating this negative, creditor-damaging side effect of shareholder
primacy.
This Response applauds both Articles, but it also suggests that we
should further expand the inquiry into shareholder primacy’s negative
consequences. There is reason to fear that the side effects of the shareholder
Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013); Lynn A.
Stout, On The Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the
Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1177-78 (2013).
2 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1912-17; Stout, supra note 1, at 1170-72.
3 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1910 (“[S]ince the early 1980s, the U.S. system has shifted from a
manager-centric system to a shareholder-centric system.”); Stout, supra note 1, at 1177-78 (describing “how shareholder primacy managed so swiftly to mature from provocative academic theory to
conventional wisdom”).
4 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1910 (“With respect to the most important decisions . . . there is
substantial reason to believe that managers and directors today largely ‘think like shareholders.’”).
5 Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1773 (2013); Rock, supra note 1.
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primacy cure are more toxic than these two Articles suggest. Indeed, they
may be threatening the health of the corporate patient.
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AS ACADEMIC CENTRAL PLANNING
The public corporation as we know it—that is, the large, publicly listed
company with professional management and dispersed shareholders—first
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. For most of that
century, shareholders remained dispersed and passive, exercising little or no
influence over boards of directors. In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
famously documented this pattern of the “separation of ownership from
control.”6 Far from being held under shareholders’ collective thumbs, boards
of directors in public firms operated as self-selecting and autonomous
decisionmaking bodies. They did not privilege shareholders’ interests or the
idea of “shareholder value” over the interests of other corporate stakeholders,
such as customers, creditors, employees, and the local community. While
shareholders were treated as an important corporate constituency, they were
not the only constituency that mattered. Nor was share price viewed as a
reliable proxy for corporate performance.
Managerialism appears to have first come under attack and the idea of
shareholder primacy seems to have first gained traction in academia. This
began during the 1970s with the rise of the Chicago school of free-market
economics and its intellectual cousin, the “law and economics” movement.7
In 1970, Milton Friedman published a famous essay in the New York Times
Magazine arguing that the only proper goal of business (which he seemed to
view as synonymous with large corporations) was the pursuit of profit for
the company’s owners (which he assumed to be its shareholders).8 In 1976,
6 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1939) (noting that public corporations are characterized by “a large
measure of separation of ownership and control”). As discussed in greater detail later, see infra text
accompanying note 45, the statement that “ownership” and “control” are separated in public
corporations reflects a mistaken notion that shareholders somehow “own” corporations. In fact, as
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010),
corporations are independent legal entities that own themselves. This legal reality has important
economic consequences that we gloss over at our peril.
7 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15-23 (2012) (discussing the rise
of shareholder primacy theory in academia); see also DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81 (“From an economic
point of view, the idea of managerialism was intolerable . . . .”).
8 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. Davis traces the intellectual roots of shareholder primacy theory back
even further to Henry Manne, who was “one of the leading lights of the ‘law and economics’
movement” and his 1965 writings on “the market for corporate control.” DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81
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Michael Jensen and William Meckling published an influential article on
the “theory of the firm,” which is still the most frequently cited academic
article in the managerial literature today.9 Jensen and Meckling argued that
the main problem in firms was coercing wayward professional managers
(whom the authors called agents) to faithfully serve the interests of the
firm’s owners (so-called principals). Like Friedman, Jensen and Meckling
treated the concepts of the “firm” and the “corporation” as synonyms, and
they assumed that the shareholders were the corporation’s owners and
residual claimants.10
Jensen and Meckling’s article was eagerly embraced by a rising generation of corporate legal scholars.11 Yet there are at least two odd aspects to
legal scholars’ enthusiasm for the “agency cost” approach to understanding
the nature of corporate law. First, the classic agency cost model relied on
patently inaccurate assumptions about the legal structure of corporations.
As a legal matter, directors are not agents subject to shareholders’ control;
nor do shareholders own corporations, which are legal entities that “own”
themselves; nor are shareholders the sole residual claimants of functioning
public companies, although they can come close to that status in insolvent
firms.12 Because Friedman, Meckling, and Jensen were economists, and not
lawyers, they were perhaps understandably ignorant of the complex web of
rights and responsibilities that comprise the modern public company. This
ignorance allowed them to assume that large public corporations were
simply larger versions of the familiar sole proprietorship or small, closelyheld company.13 But it is curious that scholars with formal legal training
(including, for many years, the Author) so easily accepted their views.
(discussing Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965). Rock emphasizes the role of Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 1976 article. Rock,
supra note 1, at 1913 (discussing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).
9 ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM
CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 10-13 (2011).
10 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 309 (“[T]he relationship between the stockholders
and manager of a corporation fit[s] the definition of a pure agency relationship . . . .”).
11 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 9 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS
OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 10-66 (1980).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
13 A similar lack of legal sophistication explains why many who defend shareholder primacy
in public corporations rely on dicta from the antiquated Michigan corporate law case of Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), to argue that corporate law mandates shareholder
primacy. Dodge was primarily a close corporation case, and it has been cited by modern Delaware
courts only in that context. However, in modern public corporations, the business judgment rule
leaves boards with ample room to pursue corporate objectives other than increasing shareholder
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The second odd aspect of the law and economics approach to corporate
governance is that it led many emerging corporate scholars to believe that
managerialism was outmoded and inefficient and that corporate law and
practice needed reform from the outside.14 In other words, economic
analysis led many legal experts to conclude that academics had better
insight into how to run businesses than businesspeople themselves; that the
voluntary contractual arrangements of atomized individuals were inferior to
mandatory governance rules imposed by reformers and regulators; and that
uniform, “one size fits all” practices produced better corporate governance
than diverse, individualized arrangements. Such beliefs are anathema to
free-market economists like Friedrich Hayek, who placed far more faith in
voluntary arrangements that evolve naturally from the needs of atomistic
individuals in the business world than attempts at the “intelligent design” of
institutions by bureaucrats or academics.15 Nevertheless, embracing economic
analysis led many legal scholars to attempt the academic equivalent of
bureaucratic central planning in corporate governance.
Despite the shaky intellectual foundations of shareholder primacy theory,
the shareholder primacy theorists had impeccable timing. By the late 1970s
and early 1980s, managerialism—which had dominated the business world
for more than half a century—had become suddenly and uniquely vulnerable to critique. This vulnerability can be traced to two developments: the
1973–74 bear market, and corporate raiders discovery that the stock market
often undervalued the conglomerate business structure that many managerialist boards and executives had favored.16
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY BECOMES DOGMA
It is worth noting that managerialist practices did not cause the 1973–74
bear market, which saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average lose nearly forty
percent of its value. Managerialism, after all, had been around for more
than half a century. The Arab oil embargo, which quadrupled oil prices, and
Richard Nixon’s inflation-triggering decision to take the United States off
wealth. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,
168-72 (2008) (“[C]ourts regularly allow corporate directors to make business decisions that harm
shareholders in order to benefit other corporate constituencies.”).
14 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923
(1984) (discussing calls for reform).
15 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 88-100 (1944) (arguing for the superiority of economic freedom over central planning).
16 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 81-87 (discussing how the conglomerate trend opened managerialism to criticism and the chronic undervaluation of corporations); Stout, supra note 1, at 1172-73
(discussing the role of the 1973–74 bear market).
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the gold standard were far more plausible causes of the market decline.17
Still, the stock market’s abysmal performance during the early 1970s opened
the door to doubts about managerialism’s efficacy.
Similarly, the discovery that the stock market tended to undervalue large
conglomerates comprised of many different business divisions, relative to
the price the market attached to those business divisions when trading as
freestanding entities, provided highly questionable evidence that managerialism was inefficient in any sense other than the very narrow sense of
maximizing current share price.18 The 1980s, however, were the heyday of a
particularly extreme version of the “efficient market hypothesis” that held
that stock prices always reflected true economic value.19 Thus, the phenomenon of conglomerate undervaluation was viewed at the time as prima facie
evidence that large conglomerates were poorly run.20 Today, it is widely
understood that stock market prices can deviate significantly from underlying
value21 and that shares in diversified conglomerates often trade at a discount
that does not necessarily reflect diminished operating performance.22
Whatever the limits of conglomerate discounts and the 1973–74 bear
market as evidence of managerialism’s supposed inefficiency, by the mid1980s, many shareholders in public companies had become disillusioned.
Some shareholders, such as corporate raiders Carl Icahn, T. Boone Pickens,
and Ronald Perelman, saw opportunities to profit from buying stock in
conglomerate firms and then pressuring their boards to break them up and
sell off their pieces. This set the stage for the ascent of shareholder primacy,
as academic shareholder-primacy advocates in the ivory towers gained a
powerful ally in the form of shareholders (especially “activist” shareholders)
themselves.
Rock’s Article provides an excellent account of how lobbying efforts by
academics and shareholder activists changed corporate law and practice over

17 See OPEC Oil Embargo, 1973–1974, U.S. DEP’T ST.: OFF. HISTORIAN, http://history.state.
gov/milestones/1969-1976/OPEC (last visited May 6, 2013).
18 See Peter G. Klein, Were the Acquisitive Conglomerates Inefficient?, 32 RAND J. ECON. 745,
745-47 (2001) (challenging the idea that conglomerates are “per se inefficient”).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
20 Rock, supra note 1, at 1925 (discussing how premiums paid in buyouts were assumed to be
evidence of managerial costs and how “[i]t is now clear that there are a variety of explanations for
premiums”).
21 See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639-50 (2003) (explaining the “limits of orthodox efficient
market theory”); infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
22 Perhaps the best explanation for this phenomenon was offered by Edward Miller in his
famous paper Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162-64 (1977).
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time.23 They shifted the U.S. corporate system away from what Rock calls a
“manager-centric system” in the 1980s to the “shareholder-centric system”
we see today.24 Rather than repeat his analysis, this Response highlights
three particularly significant changes in corporate law and practice that
played large roles in creating what Rock calls the “new shareholder-centric
reality.”25
The first was a 1993 change in the tax code that encouraged public corporations to tie executive pay to “objective” performance metrics.26 Shareholder primacy theory suggested the obvious metric should be share price.
The 1993 tax code change thus dramatically shifted the manner in which
most public corporations paid their top executives: it encouraged widespread use of stock options and stock grants, which eventually ensured that
executives’ interests in raising share price thoroughly overshadowed their
salary interests. As Rock correctly observes, today there is no longer any
“empirical basis for assuming any general divergence between the CEO’s
incentives and shareholder value.”27
The second change was the increasing clout that mutual funds, pension
funds, and hedge funds enjoyed over boards of directors, due in large part to
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule changes in the 1990s and
early 2000s designed to promote greater “shareholder democracy.”28 Examples include the 1992 changes to the proxy rules, which allowed activist
hedge funds (the descendants of the 1980s corporate raiders) to coordinate
and communicate with each other;29 the 2003 adoption of NYSE and
NASDAQ listing standards requiring public companies to have a majority
of independent directors;30 and a 2004 SEC rule requiring mutual funds to
publicly disclose how they vote shares in their portfolios.31
23
24
25
26

Rock, supra note 1, at 1910.
Id.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(c) (2006) (permitting deductions for certain performance-based
compensation).
27 Rock, supra note 1, at 1919.
28 Because institutional investors have large and relatively concentrated shareholdings, they
can better overcome the rational apathy that discourages small retail investors from becoming
involved in corporate governance. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1274-83 (2008); Rock, supra note 1, at 1922.
29 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 28, at 1276-77.
30 Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 218 (Nov.
4, 2003).
31 See generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009). Prior to 2004,
most mutual fund managers routinely voted as incumbent boards recommended. After 2004, the
vast majority have “outsourced” their voting decisions to commercial proxy advisory services,
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Finally, a third change that greatly advanced the shareholder primacy
agenda was a fundamental shift in business leaders’ subjective beliefs about
the purpose of public corporations—to maximize shareholder wealth, of
course. As shareholder primacy theory was embraced by professors in
economics departments and in law and business schools in the 1970s and
1980s, those professors in turn taught its precepts to their students. Those
students eventually became today’s CEOs, directors, investment managers,
policymakers, and regulators. Thus, shareholder primacy has become
dogma: a belief system so widely accepted that most of those who embrace
it cannot recall where they first learned of it or explain what evidence
supports it over other theories.32
The result of these developments is that the idea of the managerial corporation is, as Rock cogently states, “dead and should be buried. Managers
now largely think and act like shareholders.”33 What modern academics long
viewed as the core problem of corporate law—the agency cost problem of
self-interested managers exploiting powerless shareholders—“has largely
been solved.”34 So where do we go from here?
III. SHAREHOLDER NIRVANA THREATENS CREDITOR WELFARE
People—including professors—are creatures of habit. Corporate scholars
whose writing has focused for decades on the problem of managerial
malfeasance may be easily tempted to simply keep doing what they have
always done. That is, they may continue assuming that the primary problem
we need to address in public corporations is still managers exploiting
shareholders, and that public corporations need an even stronger dose of the
shareholder primacy cure.35 Rock and Adler and Kahan deserve great praise
for being more observant. They recognize that the corporate landscape has
changed. Rather than ruminating over old, well-chewed problems, they look
ahead to identify the challenges that the new terrain presents.
And they see challenges. The Articles by Rock and by Adler and Kahan
are pioneering contributions to what seems likely to prove an emerging new
literature in corporate governance. In this new literature, the focus of

especially Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which often embrace shareholder primacy
ideals. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 28, at 1277-78.
32 See STOUT, supra note 7, at 21.
33 Rock, supra note 1, at 1988.
34 Id. at 1909.
35 See id. at 1925 (referring to “[a]cademics’ stubborn focus on the ‘problem’ of managerial
resistance”).
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attention will shift away from conflicts between the interests of corporate
managers and those of shareholders. Adler and Kahan believe that this shift
will occur not only because “the agency costs between a firm’s shareholders
and its managers have recently declined.”36 It will also occur because the
very developments that have reduced the shareholder–manager conflict have
worsened a different conflict: the conflict between creditors and shareholders.37
Corporate nirvana for shareholders, as Rock and Adler and Kahan point
out, can be hazardous to creditors’ financial health. In making this observation,
they remind readers of a basic reality of the institutional complexity we call
a corporation. If the corporation (as economists like to say) is a “nexus of
contracts,” many of those contracts (as economists also like to say) are
seriously “incomplete.” Creditors—at least, voluntary creditors—can
bargain with the firm and try to negotiate detailed debt covenants that
protect them against foolish or opportunistic corporate behavior. But, given
the substantial costs of contracting, the impossibility of predicting all
possible future changes in circumstances, and the riskiness of relying on
imperfectly informed outside observers like courts to enforce contractual
provisions, it is inevitable that circumstances may arise where boards can
make decisions that threaten corporate creditors’ interests, and debt contracts will not clearly and completely control board behavior.38
This means that how a board of directors chooses to run a corporation
has a substantial effect not only on shareholders’ but also creditors’ welfare.
For example, a board of directors can choose to avoid risky business projects, refuse to “leverage” the firm by taking on additional debt, and hoard
its cash rather than pay out dividends or repurchase shares. Each of these
business strategies benefits creditors by reducing the chance of insolvency.
Conversely, a board can embrace risky new ventures, borrow wildly, and pay
lavish dividends. These strategies all increase shareholders’ expected returns
while reducing creditors’ chances of repayment.
The result, as Adler and Kahan discuss, is that “the interests of shareholders and those of creditors sometimes conflict.”39 There is a tension
between the way creditors would like boards to run firms and the way
shareholders would like boards to run firms. A necessary corollary is that
changes in corporate law and practice that make boards more attentive to
shareholders’ interests can prove harmful to creditors. As Rock notes,
36
37
38

Adler & Kahan, supra note 5, at 1775.
Id. at 1775-76; Rock, supra note 1, at 1926-29.
See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
178-81 (2011) (discussing reasons why virtually all contracts are incomplete to some degree).
39 Adler & Kahan, supra note 5, at 1777.
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“When shareholders are in control . . . there is less reason to worry about
shareholder–manager agency costs. But the downside of shareholder control
is that the incentive to externalize risk onto creditors comes to the fore.”40
The problem is more than theoretical. Rock’s Article cites several empirical studies that support the view that changes in corporate law and practice
that have caused boards and executives to focus more on shareholder wealth
have had negative effects on bondholders.41 Rock also provides a detailed
case study of Dynegy, Inc. to illustrate how Dynegy’s shareholders sought to
extract “shareholder value” at the expense of Dynegy’s creditors.42
Having shown that moving toward a more shareholder-centric system of
corporate governance has put creditors at risk, Rock and Adler and Kahan
all offer concrete suggestions for addressing this emerging problem. Rock
surveys some common contractual solutions to the creditor–shareholder
conflict. He also insightfully analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of
creditors’ various existing legal protections, including fraudulent conveyance
law, legal limits on dividends and corporate repurchases, and different
understandings of directors’ duty of loyalty and duty to obey the law.43
Adler and Kahan offer a novel and creative proposal by arguing that we
should expand creditors’ remedies against third parties, including creating
notice procedures analogous to those already employed by secured creditors.44
Both Rock’s analysis and Adler and Kahan’s proposal have several
strengths. This Response suggests that they also share one significant
weakness. In brief, they do not go far enough. Thus, the remainder of this
Response argues that we should consider an alternative approach to the
problem of dealing with shareholder primacy’s toxic side effects and stop
asking public corporations to take the shareholder primacy cure.
IV. MORE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY:
DAMAGE TO STAKEHOLDERS OTHER THAN CREDITORS
When asked to explain exactly why corporations should focus solely on
maximizing shareholder value, nonexperts typically default to empirically
false claims like “shareholders own corporations” or “the law says corporations

40
41
42
43
44

Rock, supra note 1, at 1928.
Id. at 1928-29.
Id. at 1966-77.
See id. at 1944.
Adler & Kahan, supra note 5, at 1797.
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must maximize profits for shareholders.”45 More sophisticated shareholder
primacy advocates typically rely on a different factual assertion: that
shareholders are the sole “residual claimants” in corporations.46 According
to this view, because the claims that nonshareholders such as creditors,
employees, or taxing authorities have against corporations are fixed by
contract or by law, maximizing the value of the shareholders’ residual
interest in the corporation is equivalent to maximizing the value of the
corporation itself, which in turn maximizes social value.47
The shareholders-are-the-residual-claimants argument has its roots in
bankruptcy law. At least in theory, when an insolvent company is liquidated,
shareholders receive any assets remaining in the firm after the legal and
contractual claims of other stakeholder groups (employees, creditors,
suppliers, and government tax collectors) have been paid in full.48 As both
Rock’s and Adler and Kahan’s discussions of the tension between shareholders’
and creditors’ interests implicitly admit, however, it is not accurate to treat
shareholders as the sole residual claimants in a company that is not insolvent. In fact, outside the bankruptcy context, it is highly misleading to
suggest that shareholders are legally entitled to receive each and every
penny of corporate profit left over after the fixed claims of other stakeholders have been paid. To the contrary, the corporation as a legal entity is its
own residual claimant, with legal title to its profits; shareholders are only
legally entitled to whatever dividends the board of directors might, in its
business judgment, declare. The interests of creditors, employees, suppliers,
and taxing authorities are likewise neither fixed nor static. In solvent
corporations, the business judgment rule gives boards legal discretion at any
time to increase employee salaries and benefits, treat suppliers more
generously, retain earnings to give creditors a larger “equity cushion,” or
decline to pursue aggressive tax-avoidance strategies.

45 The Author has explained at length elsewhere why each of these claims is false. See
STOUT, supra note 7, at 24-46. In brief, corporations are legal entities that own themselves;
shareholders merely own a contract with the corporation called a “share,” just as bondholders own
a contract with the firm called “debt.” Similarly, the vast majority of corporate charters state that
the company was formed to do “anything lawful.” In addition, the business judgment rule grants
boards the legal discretion to pursue a wide range of corporate goals beyond shareholder wealth.
46 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 36 (in “ordinary” circumstances, “employees and debt investors hold[] rights to fixed payoffs and equity investors hold[] a residual
claim to profits, which the other participants promise to maximize”).
47 Id.
48 However, empirical corporate law scholar Lynn LoPucki has found that shareholders are
not always treated as residual claimants even in bankruptcy. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the
Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1343 (2004) (concluding that “no
identifiable, single residual owner class exists in most reorganizing large public companies”).
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In other words, as discussed earlier, the contracts that corporations as
legal entities enter into with counterparties are always, to a lesser or greater
extent, incomplete. Moreover, corporations have noncontractual legal
obligations (for example, to tort victims and taxing authorities) that are
fluid and uncertain. Finally, corporations can and often do provide noncontractual and nonlegal external benefits to third parties, from voluntary
charitable contributions to local communities, to the development of
innovative technologies that benefit future generations.
This means that, as an empirical matter, large public corporations have
many different residual claimants, in the sense that many different individuals
and groups suffer or benefit from the way the corporation’s board of directors chooses to exercise its business judgment. Indeed, there is reason to
suspect that nonshareholders’ interests in how public companies operate
significantly outweigh shareholders’ interests.
This point becomes apparent when examining the earnings statement of
almost any large public corporation. Over the course of a year, a functioning
public company may make dividend payments to shareholders or retain
profits that (indirectly and unpredictably) contribute to “shareholder
wealth” by raising share price. But any dividends paid or earnings retained
by the corporation are typically grossly outweighed by the payments the
corporation makes to debtholders, employees, suppliers, and the taxing
authorities. They are also grossly outweighed by the market value of the
goods and services the corporation provides to another essential stakeholder
group: customers.
As an example, consider the 2011 earnings statement of Abbott Laboratories, a publicly traded pharmaceutical company.49 In 2011, Abbott reaped
$4.7 billion in net earnings that could, if the Abbott board so decided, be
paid out as dividends to shareholders.50 (In fact, Abbott paid only $2.9
billion in dividends.51) Yet in the same year, Abbott paid $33 billion to its
employees and suppliers, as reflected in its reported operating costs.52 It also

49 ABBOTT LABS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF EARNINGS,
available at http://www.abbott.com/static/content/microsite/annual_report/2011/01_earnings_statement.
php (last visited May 6, 2013). The Author selected Abbott Labs at random from an alphabetized
list of publicly traded pharmaceutical companies and believes its payment pattern is typical of
many large public corporations.
50 ABBOTT LABS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS,
available at http://www.abbott.com/static/content/microsite/annual_report/2011/03_cash_flows.php
(last visited May 6, 2013).
51 Id.
52 ABBOTT LABS., supra note 49.
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paid $530 million in interest to creditors and $470 million in taxes.53 Finally,
Abbott also sold $38.9 billion in medical devices, prescription drugs, and
nutritional products to consumers who presumably benefited from these
products.54
As both Rock’s and Adler and Kahan’s Articles illustrate, shareholdercentric management practices that benefit the Abbott shareholders, who
received $2.9 billion in dividends in 2011, may harm the Abbott bondholders
who received $530 million in interest. But because Abbott’s contracts are
incomplete and its legal obligations and the external benefits it provides are
not fixed and immutable, shareholder-centric practices may also pose a
potential threat to the much larger interests, measured by financial flows, of
Abbott’s employees, suppliers, customers, and taxing authorities.
By offering solutions to the shareholder–creditor conflict, which they
argue is worsened when managers focus on “shareholder value,” Rock’s and
Adler and Kahan’s Articles thus offer solutions to only one, possibly minor,
negative side effect of the shift to shareholder-centric corporate governance.
While shareholder primacy may allow shareholders to do only a little better
at the expense of creditors, it may allow shareholders to do a lot better at
the expense of employees, suppliers, consumers, local communities, and the
Internal Revenue Service.
This raises problems of efficiency as well as equity. In the context of the
shareholder–creditor conflict, it is easy to see how changing corporate law
and practice to make it easier for shareholders to benefit at creditors’
expense permits a one-time increase in shareholder wealth, while simultaneously making it more difficult and expensive for corporations to borrow in
the future. A similar problem arises when a shift to shareholder primacy
allows shareholders to exploit other corporate stakeholders.
Writing alone and with Margaret Blair, the Author has explored elsewhere how board-centric governance can encourage nonshareholder stakeholders to make vital specific investments in corporate production that
cannot be fully protected by contract or law.55 For example, employees may
work harder than their formal contracts require, suppliers may allow
invoices to go unpaid during times of weak cash flow, customers may invest
time and effort in learning how to use the company’s products, and communities
may build specialized infrastructure, such as roads or schools, to support the
53
54
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Id.
Id.
See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 7, at 74-85; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (noting that “boards exist not to
protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of
the corporate ‘team’”).
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corporations’ needs. Stakeholders make such specific investments not
because they are fully protected by law or contract, but because they believe
a board-governed, managerialist firm will, to some extent, respect their
contributions and treat them fairly. By contrast, stakeholders rationally
distrust dispersed shareholders who can personally profit from threatening
to expropriate or destroy the value of stakeholders’ specific investments.
This makes it harder for shareholder-focused public corporations to attract
dedicated employees, loyal customers, cooperative suppliers, and support
from local communities. Shifting public corporations from the managerial
model to the shareholder-centric model thus can produce a one-time
increase in “shareholder wealth,” while simultaneously eroding public
corporations’ long-term ability to generate profits, just as fishing with
dynamite produces a one-time increase in catch size while eroding longterm fishing returns.56
V. STILL MORE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS: UNLEASHING
SHAREHOLDER SHORT-TERMISM
The previous Part argued that the shift toward shareholder primacy
exacerbates tensions between shareholders and creditors and further
worsens economically significant tensions between shareholders’ interests
and those of stakeholders like employees, customers, and suppliers. In other
words, shareholder primacy’s negative side effects may operate on a much
larger scale than either Rock or Adler and Kahan suggest. Yet there is
another toxic side effect to fear from shareholder primacy—unleashing
shareholder short-termism.
Shareholder primacy theory implicitly treats shareholders as a homogeneous group with identical interests. In reality, of course, “shareholders” are
human beings who happen to own shares in public companies. Their
individual interests can diverge substantially.57 One source of conflict of
interest among shareholders is differences in the period of time shareholders
expect to hold their shares. Some shareholders, especially “mom and pop”
individual investors, buy stocks to invest in long-term goals like retirement
or paying a child’s college tuition. Others are short-term investors (speculators might be a more accurate description) who hope to reap trading profits
from stock price movements over periods of weeks, days, or even (in the

56
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See STOUT, supra note 7, at 51-52.
See id., at 8-9; see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power,
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93 (2006).
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case of “flash trading” hedge funds) mere seconds.58 There is reason to
suspect short-term investors want boards to manage corporations in ways
that are quite different from what longer-term investors prefer.
In particular, many people in business believe certain strategies can raise
a company’s share price without necessarily improving, and indeed possibly
harming, its long-term performance. A large share repurchase program is
one classic example; cutting or minimizing reported expenses for employee
salaries, customer support, or research and development is another.59
Empirical studies of “activist” hedge funds that typically hold shares only
for a year or so confirm that these are exactly the sorts of corporate strategies they pressure boards to adopt.60 Yet large share repurchase programs
raise the risk of insolvency. Cutting the budgets for employees, customer
support, and research and development also threatens a company’s longterm growth. In either case, managers focusing on next year’s share price
have less time and energy to spend planning for the next decade. These
possible negative effects of focusing on share price—which damage not only
the company’s creditors, employees, customers, and other stakeholders, but
also its long-term shareholders—do not concern the short-term speculator
who plans to sell and get out before any damage becomes apparent.
Accordingly, shifting to a shareholder-centric corporate system increases
the risk that boards and executives will make more myopic business decisions. The risk is great for at least two reasons. First, institutional investors
enjoy far more clout in the boardroom than individual investors do, and two
important categories of institutional investors—actively managed mutual
funds and hedge funds—are notorious for typically holding shares for only
one or two years. (The growing dominance of mutual funds and hedge
funds in the market partly explains why the average holding period for
stocks listed on U.S. exchanges has declined from eight years in 1960 to
around four months today.61) Second, the emphasis on “pay for performance”
also gives executives, whose pay is largely determined by how the stock
58 See Nick Baumann, Too Fast To Fail, MOTHER JONES, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 36-38 (describing
flash trading).
59 See, e.g., Slav Fedorov, Does A Stock Buyback Affect the Price?, MOTLEY FOOL, http://wiki.fool.
com/Does_a_Stock_Buyback_Affect_the_Price%3F (last visited May 6, 2013) (“A stock buyback
usually pushes up the price . . . .”). The belief that repurchases raise share price has both
empirical and theoretical support. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1252-56 (1990). This effect of
repurchases helps explain the massive amounts of equity public companies have retired in recent
years. See Rock, supra note 1, at 1919.
60 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401 (2007)
(“Activist hedge funds look for . . . free cash, and cuttable costs.”).
61 STOUT, supra note 7, at 66.
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performs for the next year or two, personal incentive to focus on short-term
share prices instead of focusing on the company’s longer-term future.
While business leaders often complain about short-term pressures,62
some academics argue that their complaints must be either insincere or
naïve, because it is impossible to raise a company’s short-term share price
while harming its long-term prospects.63 According to this argument, the
stock market will recognize if damage is being done. Adopting destructive
short-term strategies will cause stock price to decline, punishing any
management team foolish enough to follow such a course.
This critique fails for two reasons. First, it relies on an extreme version
of the once-popular efficient market hypothesis, which, at one time, was
thought to predict that the market price of a corporation’s shares accurately
reflected the best possible estimate of the company’s fundamental economic
value.64 Today this version of the efficient market hypothesis has been
largely discredited both empirically and theoretically.65 Even shareholder
primacy advocates now concede that the stock market can over- or undervalue a company’s shares for some period.66 From the perspective of a hedge
fund manager hoping to profit from flipping shares held for a few months
or an executive planning to sell vested shares, only a few months of over- or
underpricing is needed.

62 See, e.g., ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A
CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
3 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/
Overcoming%20Short-termism%20AspenCVSG%2015dec09.pdf (outlining “recommendations to
focus attention . . . on the intricate problems of short-termism”).
63 See Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate
Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 668 (1989) (noting how many academic economists dismiss fears of
managerial myopia as inconsistent with efficient market theory).
64 See Stout, supra note 21, at 640-41 (discussing the idea of fundamental value efficiency,
which requires markets to respond “quickly” and “accurately” to “available information”). Today,
even those who favor the efficient market hypothesis typically adhere to a much weaker “informational efficiency” version that simply predicts it is difficult to make short-term profits trading on
publicly available information. See id. at 640-42.
65 Id. at 667 (“[T]he evidence . . . does not support the close correlation between price and
value predicted by orthodox efficient markets theory.”). Economist John Quiggin calls the efficient
market hypothesis a “zombie idea” that is intellectually dead but still exercises influence. See
generally JOHN QUIGGIN, ZOMBIE ECONOMICS: HOW DEAD IDEAS STILL WALK AMONG US
35-77 (2010).
66 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, How To Tie Equity Compensation to LongTerm Results, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 99, 104 (2010) (arguing that pay arrangements that tie
compensation to share price can lead to loss in long-term value); Michael C. Jensen, The Agency
Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549, 553554 (2004).
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Second, it does not really matter whether executives and directors are
correct in believing they can raise tomorrow’s share price by adopting
strategies that harm the company later on. Because executives and directors
(not academics) run corporations, it is what they believe that counts.
Disturbingly, they seem to believe that keeping the stock price high in the
short run sometimes requires them to take steps that harm the company in
the long run. A survey of 401 corporate finance officers found that eighty
percent said they would cut expenses like marketing or product development if necessary to make their reported quarterly earnings targets, even if
they personally believed this would hurt the company’s long-term performance.67
Of course, the hedge fund manager who plans to sell his or her shares in
a few months would applaud a CFO’s decision to reject a project that would
produce profits a few years down the line if necessary to “make the numbers” next quarter. But the long-term investor who plans to hold shares for
years or decades feels differently about the matter. Solving the manager–
shareholder agency cost problem by encouraging managers to “think like
shareholders” does more than worsen the shareholder–creditor agency
problem that Rock emphasizes.68 It also creates a new shareholder–
shareholder agency problem when the new shareholder-centric reality causes
managers to think, in particular, like short-term shareholders.69
CONCLUSION: IS SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TOO TOXIC?
The classic agency cost model of the corporation presumes that the central problem to be resolved by corporate law is wayward managers exploiting helpless shareholders. To a large extent, shifts in corporate law and
practice over the past two decades have solved that problem. Yet in the
process, these shifts may have created new problems, such as the heightened
conflict between shareholders and creditors that Rock and Adler and Kahan
emphasize in their Articles.
This Response suggests that heightened shareholder–creditor tensions
may be just the tip of a large and ugly iceberg. At least in theory, moving

67 John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS
J. 27, 31 fig.4 (2006).
68 Rock, supra note 1, at 1910 (arguing that if “managers and directors today largely ‘think like
shareholders,’” then “the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem should return as a central
concern of corporate law”).
69 Shareholder primacy worsens other shareholder conflicts as well, including the conflicts
between diversified and undiversified shareholders and between asocial and prosocial shareholders.
See STOUT, supra note 7, at 86-102.
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toward shareholder-centric governance can cause boards and executives to
try to maximize shareholder wealth by exploiting the specific investments
not only of creditors, but also of other stakeholders like employees, customers, and suppliers. It can also drive managers to pursue programs designed
merely to raise share price, like share repurchases or cutting expenses. Such
strategies have the potential to increase shareholder wealth in the short
term. But in theory, they can also harm public corporations’ abilities to
generate future products and profits, to the collective detriment of creditors,
employees, consumers, suppliers, and long-term shareholders alike.
Is there any reason beyond theory to take the possibility of such negative
side effects seriously? Anyone who follows the financial press should
conclude the answer is “yes.” For over two decades, our public corporations
have been taking the shareholder primacy cure, but the patient has only
gotten sicker. In particular, U.S. public corporations are showing three
alarming negative symptoms.
The first symptom is that public companies are no longer performing
well for the shareholders whom the new shareholder-centric system was
supposed to benefit.70 After an initial spike in investor returns during the
1990s bull market, returns from holding public equity in the new “shareholdercentric reality” have been nearly flat—the “lost decade” of 2000–2009 is
becoming the lost decade-and-a-half.71 This outcome, of course, is exactly
the opposite of what shareholder primacy theorists predicted should have
resulted from the “improvements” to corporate governance made during the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It is consistent, however,
with this Response’s hypothesis that moving from a managerial model to a
shareholder-centric model produces initial increases in shareholder wealth
followed by poor subsequent returns.
The second symptom is the recent rapid decline in the number of publicly listed companies. Between 1997 and 2008, the number of corporations
(both private and public) filing U.S. tax returns increased by more than
twenty percent.72 During the same period, the number of public companies
listed on U.S. exchanges declined by nearly forty percent, from 8823 to
70 Roger Martin has calculated that between 1933 and 1976, when Jensen and Meckling published their agency cost article, see supra note 8, investors who bought the S&P 500 enjoyed real
compound annual returns of 7.5% despite the 1973–74 bear market. MARTIN, supra note 9, at 63.
After 1976, this average dropped to 6.5%. Id.
71 See MARTIN J. PRING ET AL., INVESTING IN THE SECOND LOST DECADE: A SURVIVAL
GUIDE FOR KEEPING YOUR PROFITS UP WHEN THE MARKET IS DOWN 1-18 (2012).
72 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 491
tbl.744, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0744.pdf.
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5401.73 Why are public companies disappearing as quickly as endangered
species?74 In brief, some public companies (e.g., Enron, Merrill Lynch,
Countrywide) are collapsing or being acquired after scandals and disasters,
others (e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts, Toys“R”Us) are voluntarily “going private,”
and emerging firms are choosing to stay private and not sell shares to public
investors at all.75 Again, this trend is inconsistent with shareholder primacy
theory, which predicts that as public corporations become more shareholdercentric, they should prove more attractive to investors and entrepreneurs
who are seeking to raise capital. It is consistent, however, with this Response’s
hypothesis that entrepreneurs recognize that it is becoming too difficult to
attract stakeholders’ specific contributions and too difficult to make longrange plans and investments using the public corporation form.
The third troubling symptom is an alarming decrease in the duration of
public corporations. It is estimated that the typical Fortune 500 company
had a life expectancy of seventy-five years early in the twentieth century but
now has one of only fifteen years (and that number is declining).76 It is too
easy to dismiss this troubling symptom merely as evidence of “creative
destruction.”77 Although some businesses (Twitter comes to mind) can
develop quite rapidly, it takes more than fifteen years to build a great
consumer brand name, an aerospace industry, or a cutting-edge pharmaceutical firm. And for creative destruction to be creative it must lead to greater
economic growth, not the economic stagnation we are currently experiencing.
Correlation is not causation, of course. Defenders of shareholder primacy
can reasonably argue that reduced investor returns, declining numbers of
public companies, and the shortening of large corporations’ life expectancies
can all be explained by other factors, such as global competition, too much
or too little financial regulation, or creative destruction. In some cases they
are likely right. Unfortunately, it is impossible to statistically prove what
causes these kinds of macroeconomic trends. The sample size is too small,
and the number of variables involved too large. And if we try to judge the
shareholder-centric model by looking instead to what happens to individual
companies after they adopt shareholder-friendly “reforms,” we risk making
73 DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT THORNTON: CAPITAL MARKET SERIES: A
WAKE-UP CALL FOR AMERICA, 14 exhibit 14 (2009), available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/
GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/gt_wakeup_call_.pdf.
74 See Rival Versions of Capitalism: The Endangered Public Company, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2012,
at 13 (noting that public companies are disappearing).
75 WEILD & KIM, supra note 73, at 1.
76 See Steven Denning, Why Did IBM Survive?, FORBES (July 10, 2011), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/stevedenning/2011/07/10/why-did-ibm-survive.
77 See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
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the same error as an empirical scholar who sees that fishermen who use
dynamite get more fish in the short run than fishermen who use lines and
bait, and concludes that everyone should fish with dynamite. From a policy
perspective, we should care about macroeconomic growth, and not the
possibility of temporary individual advantage. As every economics student
familiar with the “Tragedy of the Commons” knows, it is not safe to assume
the latter always leads to the former.78
But the absence of solid statistical proof on the causes of macroeconomic
phenomena does not allow us to escape their effects. Nor does it excuse us
from choosing how to respond. Whether we wish to or not, we must judge
as best we can whether shareholder primacy’s benefits from tempering the
shareholder–manager conflict outweigh its costs in terms of heightening the
conflict between shareholders and other stakeholders (including but not
limited to creditors) and the conflict between short- and long-term shareholders. If we judge the benefits of the shareholder-centric model to be
large and the costs small, it makes sense to respond as both Rock’s and
Adler and Kahan’s Articles implicitly assume we ought to respond: not by
abandoning shareholder primacy but by instead trying to smooth its rough
edges through ad hoc changes in creditors’ rights and shareholders’ obligations. This is a conservative approach unlikely to do much harm.
Yet it may not do much good either. This Response argues that both
logic and the evidence available suggest that the shareholder primacy cure is
proving more debilitating to public corporations than the managerial
disease it was supposed to remedy. Interestingly, many in the business
world seem to have already reached this conclusion. As already noted, fewer
private companies are “going public.” But those that do are increasingly
opting for multi-class share structures that permit managers to retain voting
control while leaving outside investors essentially powerless.79 One of the
first and most prominent examples was Google, which went public in 2004
with a governance structure designed to keep voting power in the hands of
the firm’s founders and executives.80 By 2009, more than eight percent of
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See STOUT, supra note 7, at 50-52 (discussing the “investor Tragedy of the Commons”).
See Adam Brown, Calpers Strategy Could Avoid IPOs with Dual Class Structures, INSIDE
INVESTOR RELATIONS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/iposprivate-share-markets/18938/calpers-could-avoid-dual-class-ipos (describing the current “trend toward
dual class voting structures”).
80 See 2004 Founder’s IPO: “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s Shareholders, GOOGLE,
http://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-founders-letter.html (last visited May 6, 2013)
(explaining Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s justification for Google’s corporate
structure and executive roles).
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firms going public had multiple share classes, and, by 2012, this figure had
risen to more than eleven percent.81 Thus, emerging companies are responding
to what Rock calls the “new shareholder-centric reality” by adopting what
the Author has elsewhere labeled “managerialism in the closet.”82
Friedrich Hayek would hardly be surprised. After all, the shareholdercentric model sprang from the minds of academics in the 1970s and 1980s,
and it became business reality in no small part due to the interventions of
regulators like the IRS and the SEC during the 1990s and beyond. Like
many market interventions driven by bureaucratic central planning, it has
proven less than successful at achieving its intended objectives of improving
corporate behavior and increasing shareholder returns. The market, ever
resilient, is adjusting and responding.
Still, it would be helpful if corporate law experts at least would stop lobbying to give our ailing public corporations even larger doses of the toxic
shareholder primacy cure. By announcing that the new shareholder-centric
reality has arrived, and by pointing out that it creates problems for creditors, Rock and Adler and Kahan may have done the business world and
business academia a great service. Hayek would be pleased. But one suspects that Hayek might have also wished that they had been bolder and
questioned the wisdom of the shareholder primacy cure.

81 Allen Latta, Thoughts on IPOs With Multi-Class Share Structures, ALLEN LATTA’S
THOUGHTS ON PRIVATE EQUITY, ETC. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.allenlatta.com/1/post/2012/
08/thoughts-on-ipos-with-multi-class-share-structures.html (explaining that, in 2009, one in twelve
IPOs had multiple share classes and, in 2012, that figure rose to one in eight).
82 See Stout, supra note 1.

